Evolution of antibodies for environmental monitoring: from mice to plants

Immunoassays are one of the most convenient methods for environmental monitoring, but have been limited so far by low yield and low affinity antibodies (Abs). With the advent of recombinant Ab (rAb) technology and the expression of these Abs in organisms such as yeast, bacteria, insects and plants, widespread monitoring of our food and environment for organic contaminants using immunoassays has become feasible. A multitude of immunoassays have been developed to detect pesticides in soils, ground and river water, foods and biological samples, such as urine and semen. In this paper, we describe advances in Ab production, the move away from using animals, phage-display technologies and the advent of plant-derived Ab expression systems. Finally, we describe future possibilities in Ab technology for environmental monitoring.     

基于随机响应时间及准时交货激励的供应链博弈-协同模型与算法

在供应链战略合作伙伴关系的体系框架下,针对采购双方动态交互决策过程建立了以供应链中核心生产企业为主方,供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈-协同模型.基于最优性分析讨论了准时采购过程中双方决策的交互影响关系,分析了Stackelberg均衡解的必要条件.最后提出了该模型的内嵌内点法的模拟退火算法.     

果树种植最佳土地租赁期的数学模型建构

以种植果树为例,根据果树种植的客观规律,引进折扣因子δ=U-α,给出了通过确定投资合同期使利润达到最大的数学模型,并进行了讨论和推广.     

手机广告链中移动运营商的努力动机研究与仿真

建立了由单手机广告主、手机广告代理商和移动运营商构成的三级广告产业链之间的基于协作的收益共享契约模型,分析了在以移动运营商为主导的手机广告链中,移动运营商的努力动机受收益共享和努力成本补偿参数的影响.采用量化分析和模拟仿真结合的方法,得出契约参数只有在满足一定条件下,移动运营商所做出的最优努力水平投入决策,将使得整个手机产业链收益最大化,实现多方共赢.     

Vendor managed inventory contracts – coordinating the supply chain while looking from the vendor’s perspective

The paper studies coordination of a supply chain when the inventory is managed by the vendor (VMI). We also provide a general mathematical framework that can be used to analyze contracts under both retailer managed inventory (RMI) and VMI. Using a simple newsvendor scenario with a single vendor and single retailer, we study five popular coordinating supply chain contracts: buyback, quantity flexibility, quantity discount, sales rebate, and revenue sharing contracts. We analyze the ability of these contracts to coordinate the supply chain under VMI when the vendor freely decides the quantity. We find that even though all of them coordinate under RMI, quantity flexibility and sales rebate contracts do not generally coordinate under VMI. Furthermore, buyback and revenue sharing contracts are equivalent. Hence, we propose two new contracts which coordinate under VMI (one of which coordinates under RMI too, provided a well-known assumption holds). Finally, we extend our analysis to consider multiple independent retailers with the vendor incurring linear or convex production cost, and show that our results are qualitatively unchanged.     

Contract type and decision right of sales promotion in supply chain management with a capital constrained retailer

From the practices of Chinese consumer electronics market, we find there are two key issues in supply chain management: The first issue is the contract type of either wholesale price contracts or consignment contracts with revenue sharing, and the second issue is the decision right of sales promotion (such as advertising, on-site shopping assistance, rebates, and post-sales service) owned by either manufacturers or retailers. We model a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who has limited capital and faces deterministic demand depending on retail price and sales promotion. The two issues interact with each other. We show that only the combination (called as chain business mode) of a consignment contract with the manufacturer’s right of sales promotion or a wholesale price contract with the retailer’s right of sales promotion is better for both members. Moreover, the latter chain business mode is realized only when the retailer has more power in the chain and has enough capital, otherwise the former one is realized. But which one is preferred by customers? We find that the former is preferred by customers who mainly enjoy low price, while the latter is preferred by those who enjoy high sales promotion level.     

Sharing risk through concession contracts

In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.     

供应和需求不确定条件下物流服务供应链能力协调研究

为解决物流能力供应和需求不确定环境下,物流服务集成商和供应商能力采购和投资的协调问题,建立了Stackelberg主从博弈下物流服务集成商和供应商的决策模型,提出了基于收益共享的能力采购费用补偿协调机制,给出了实现供应链协同以及帕雷托改进的合约参数设计和取值区间.数值分析进一步验证了该协调机制的有效性,以及供应和需求波动对决策双方行为的影响.研究结果表明,物流服务集成商通过调节合约参数取值能有效协调供应和需求随机环境下物流服务供应链的采购和投资风险.     

Manufacturer-buyer coordination for newsvendor-type-products with two ordering opportunities and partial backorders

In a recent paper [Weng, Z.K., 2004. Coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer: A generalized newsvendor model. European Journal of Operational Research 156, 148–161], a newsvendor-type coordination model was developed for a single-manufacturer single-buyer channel with two ordering opportunities. This paper further extends the model to the case where the excess demand after the first order is partially backlogged and both parties share the manufacturing setup cost of the second order (if happened). We show that the decentralized system would perform best if the manufacturer covers utterly the second production setup cost, which is opposite to that obtained in Weng (2004). Another extension in the present paper is that in the centralized system, the second order decision is made by the buyer based on the channel’s benefit rather than based on the buyer’s benefit as in Weng (2004). It is proved that the expected profit of the system in our paper is always larger than that in Weng (2004). In order to maximize the expected profit of the channel, two coordinated policies are proposed to achieve perfect coordination: a two-part-tariff policy for the special case that the buyer pays all the manufacturing setup cost, and a revised revenue-sharing contract for the case that two parties share the manufacturing setup cost.